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**DECODING OF LANGUAGE-SPECIFIC NOTIONS OF THE CONCEPT
“FREEDOM”, “LIBERTY” IN ENGLISH AND «ԱՋՍՏՈՒԹՅՈՒՆ» IN
ARMENIAN**

ABSTRACT

In Linguoculturology the concept is considered to be a condensation of the culture. The structure of concept includes all the components which make the etymology of the culture, modern combinations, estimations, etc. The connection of concept with the verbal expressive devices is marked in all the formulations of linguoculturology. The concept in language is related with more than a word-unite. It is expressed through a group of synonymous words. The present article studies linguocultural concept of "freedom" in English and «ազատութիւն» in Armenian.

Key words: *linguoculture, concept, freedom, liberty, cultural idea, semantic profile, negative semantics*

**ДЕКОДИРОВАНИЕ ЯЗЫКОВЫХ ОСОБЕННОСТЕЙ ЗНАЧЕНИЯ
КОНЦЕПТА СЛОВ “FREEDOM”, “LIBERTY” В АНГЛИЙСКОМ И
«ԱՋՍՏՈՒԹՅՈՒՆ» В АРМЯНСКОМ**

РЕЗЮМЕ

Данная статья посвящена изучению концепта “свободы” в англо-американской и армянской лингвистике. В ней четко описываются лингвистические особенности иноязычных слов freedom и liberty с точки зрения современных англо-американских культур.

Обсуждаются проблемы, связанные с пониманием понятия свободы в армянской действительности, а также вопросы, связанные с происхождением этих слов.

Ключевые слова: лингвокультура, концепт, независимость, свобода, культурная идея, семантический профиль, отрицательная семантика.

“FREEDOM”, “LIBERTY” ԵՎ «ԱԶՍՏՈՒԹՅՈՒՆ» ՀԱՍԿԱՑՈՒՅԹԻ ԼԵԶՎԱԿԱՆ և ԱՐՏԱԼԵԶՎԱԿԱՆ ԱՌԱՆՁՆԱՀԱՏՎՈՒԹՅՈՒՆՆԵՐԻ ՎԵՐԾԱՆՈՒՄ

ԱՄՓՈՓՈՒՄ

Սույն հոդվածը նվիրված է ազատության հասկացության ուսումնասիրմանը անգլոամերիկյան և հայկական լեզվամշակույթներում: Հոդվածում հստակ կերպով ներկայացվում են freedom և liberty հասկացությունների լեզվական և արտալեզվական առանձնահատկությունները ժամանակակից անգլոամերիկյան մշակութակիրների դիտանկյունից, զուհագեռներ անցկացվում հայկական իրականությունում ազատություն հասկացության ընկալման հետ ինչպես նաև քննարկվում են դրանց ծագմանն առնչվող հարցերը:

Բանալի բառեր` լեզվամշակույթ, հասկացույթ, անկախություն, ազատություն, մշակութային գաղափար, իմաստարանական պրոբլիմ, բացասական իմաստարանություն

The tendency towards cross-penetration of different branches of science is one of the main characteristics of the 21th century. In the sphere of linguoculturology the expression of this tendency towards synthesis has become the activation of culturological investigation i.e. the investigation of the phenomenon of culture, including manifold nature of human activity

and its results. Currently, there is a tendency towards the development of linguoculturology into science devoted to the study and description of correspondence of language and culture in synchronous interaction. Each newly-formed branch of science needs for its own terminological apparatus. The idea of concepts which is intensely developing can serve as a basis for such an apparatus.

In linguoculturology the concept is considered to be a condensation of the culture. According to Stepanov the structure of concept includes all the things which make it the etymology of the culture, modern combinations, estimations etc. (Stepanov, 1958). In all the formulations of linguoculturology the connection of concept with the verbal expressive devices is marked. The concept in the language is related with more than a word-unit. It is expressed through a group of synonymous words. In the following article we are going to decode language-specific notions of the concept "Freedom", "Liberty" and "Ազատություն":

Apparently, the concept encrypted in the English word freedom may seem to be identical with that encrypted in the Latin word libertas. On closer inspection, however, certain interesting differences emerge. As a matter of fact, in some sentences with libertas, freedom could not be used, or would change the meaning. For example, the expression freedom of speech could not be used in the sense of "frankness", "outspokenness" or "poetic license" (and "freedom of words" would not be used at all), nor would one speak English of freedom maintained with impunity. Likewise, one could not exercise freedom as one could exercere ("exercise") libertatem, as in the quote from Livy. In English one can "exercise power" or "exercise one's rights" but not freedom. Moreover, one could not always translate freedom as libertas. In particular, phrases such as freedom from persecutions or freedom from tyranny could not be rendered as libertas ab insectatione or libertas a dominatione, because libertas did not take "negative" complements of this kind.

Principal differences between the two ideas relates to what might be called «negative" orientation of freedom. This "negative" orientation can be understood in two different ways. Firstly, it has to do with being able not to do things that one does not want to do, and secondly, with being able to do things that one wants to do without interference from other people. The first aspect can be represented as follows: freedom-if I don't want to do something I don't have to do it. (Berlin, 1969:122-123).

The next "negative" characteristic of freedom is emphasized in Isaiah Berlin's discussion of what he calls "notion of negative freedom". Unfortunately, as mentioned earlier in Berlin's discussion the English words freedom and liberty are used conversely. This is confusing because these two words do not have the same meaning, and in fact Berlin calls "the notion of negative freedom" has become largely incorporated in the word freedom, where the word "liberty" in its earlier meaning was much closer to the Latin *libertas* and in its present meaning reflects a different concept, which is a product of the Anglo-Saxon culture. The polarization of the two concepts freedom and liberty is in itself culturally revealing-a point which is lost if the two words are used conversely (Berlin, 1969:122-123).

It is important to mention that Berlin's emphasis on the preposition from ("liberty from"). Actually, the English word liberty does not take the preposition from, and never did, while the word freedom does. This syntactic property of the word freedom, which differentiates it from *libertas* as well as liberty, gives evidence for the opinion that the new conception of what *libertas*/liberty should be made up of in led to the emergence in Anglo-culture of a new concept: that enclosed in the word freedom, as it is used in modern English, the meaning of this concept is as follows: 1) someone can think something like this 2) if I want to do something I can do it 3) no one else can say to me "you cannot do this because I do not want this" 4) if I don't want to do something I do not have

to do it 5) no one else can say to me "you have to do it because I want this" 6) this is good for x, 7) it is bad if someone can't think this.

Words such as liberty or freedom present the states of affairs to which they refer as morally as good. Undoubtedly, English phrases and expressions such as free of taxes and free of tourists do not suggest any moral judgment in the way words such as kind, courageous, honest and just do. It is wrong to come to the conclusion that the word free is free of any evaluative element. Free does not imply an absolute value judgment, but it does simply a value relative to the experiencer. The collocation free from Z implies that Z is seen as something bad for the person X and that it is good for X to be free from it.

In English one can speak not only of "freedom of" or "freedom to" but also "freedom from". The combination of freedom with the preposition from has been possible in English for centuries, but in modern English the range of nouns which can be occurring in this phrase has changed. For example, Oxford cites the following sentences illustrating this pattern:

Though age from folly could not give me freedom, it does from childnesse (Shakespeare, 1976)

Promising to the doers long life, health..., freedom from losses, and the like. (Purchas, 1981)

The contemplation of our own freedom from evils which we see represented. (Burke, 1956)

However in modern English, one would not speak of freedom from folly, childishness, losses or evils. Nor would one speak of freedom from illness, death, stupidity, injustice or neglect. On the other hand, one may very well speak of freedom from persecution, harassment, oppression, tyranny, coercion, external control or interruption.

This isolation, though it had, as Wittgenstein anticipated, great disadvantage, was necessary he were to enjoy the freedom from interruption he thought essential for his work. (Monk, 1991)

As a sort of rhetorical extension, freedom from X can also be used in situations when some condition stops us to do what we want to do and what we have the right to do, as in the case of freedom from hunger or freedom from poverty. These expressions establish a kind of political statement: "Everyone has the right to do what they want to do and not to be prevented from by X (hunger, poverty etc). The inference is that hunger, poverty and so on are social conditions enacted on the sufferers by other people. Freedom from illness is not felicitous because it would imply that illness, too, is a social evil, imposed on some people by other people's actions or impardonable neglect.

This "negative" semantics of freedom corresponds, then, to the ideal of "non-imposition", which is one of the most important cultural themes in the Anglo world. It is not the ability to do whatever one wants that is a key Anglo ideal, because the supreme goal of individual rights is linked in this culture with a general recognition of other people's individual rights. It is "non-imposition" which is the main idea "Maybe I can't do some things that I'd like to do, but at least no one else is going to prevent me from doing what I want and what I have the right to do." It is crucial to this conception that what applies also to everyone else: freedom is not just a privilege that some people may enjoy but a universal right. The emergence of the concept of freedom in the English language reflects the rise of this modern ideal and the victory of freedom over liberty is a testimony to the shift in preoccupations and in values (Wierzbirska, 1957:132).

The Statue of Liberty was and still is a symbol of America. The ideal of liberty encrypted in seventeenth and eighteenth century English seems to have quickly declined in America as the need to fight for this ideal came to be perceived as less pressing.

In 1788, George Washington wrote "Liberty when it begins to take root is a plant of rapid growth" (quoted in Stevenson, 1958:1104). In general perception, by the end of eighteenth century, the plant of liberty had not only taken root in America but had grown so rapidly that Benjamin

Franklin felt able to proclaim confidently, "The sun of liberty is set: you might light up the candle of industry and economy" (quoted in Stevenson, 1958:1104).

However, if it was considered that the "sun of liberty" was set "the sun of freedom" was beginning to rise. The eighteenth-century liberty stood, rather like the Latin *libertas* (or the French *liberte*), for the opposite of slavery and oppression, and the rise of democracy in America has no doubt contributed to the decline of "liberty" as an ideal to be constantly struggle for (Tocqueville, 1953:1835). It seems rational to assume that it has, contributed to the decline of the use of the word liberty, and to a narrowing of its meaning. In behalf of the intuitive impression that the word liberty has declined in use, we will mention two illustrative figures: in the corpus of Shakespeare's works, there are, roughly speaking, 100 occurrences of liberty per 1 million words, whereas in the modern COBUILD corpus, there are, roughly speaking, 100 occurrences of liberty per 10 million words, and if we discount the occurrences of liberty per 20 million words. The proportion of liberty to Liberty (Jonathan Mayhew, 1952:104) is significant in itself, since names and places, landmarks and institutions are often inherited from earlier times and often enshrine older concepts and ideals.

At the same time, however, the growth of individualism in both England and America and the spread of the philosophy of individual rights (Berlin, 1969:137) have led, as we have seen, to the emergence and spread of a new concept of "freedom" reflected in the English word freedom in the modern sense of the word, that is to say, a concept defined more in opposition "interference" and "imposition" than to "slavery" or "oppression". Furthermore, the word liberty did not disappear from use altogether but underwent semantic change. If the word freedom focused above all, on the rights of an individual to be "left alone" by other people, the word liberty became gradually specialized in "public rights", that is, in the rights of social groups, guaranteed by suitable political structures.

To appreciate this shift in the meaning of liberty, it is sufficient to think about some older uses of this word, reflected, for example, in the following quotations:

So loving-jealous of his liberty (Shakespeare, *Romeo and Juliet*, quoted in Stevenson, 1958).

Man's liberty ends, and it ought to end, when that liberty becomes the curse of his neighbours. (Frederic William Ferrar, *Ideal of nations*, quoted in Stevenson, 1958)

The liberty of the individual must be thus far limited; he must not make himself a nuisance to other people. (J. S. Mill, *On Liberty*, quoted in Stevenson, 1958)

I enjoy large liberty to round this Globe Of Earth.(Milton, 1971)

The differences between the modern English concept of "freedom" and the older concept of "liberty" are perfectly illustrated by the difference in meaning between the two expressions: freedom of speech and liberty of the tongue.

Freedom of speech highlights the fact that other people can't stop us from saying what we want to say. Liberty of the tongue highlights the fact that one says what one wants to say without taking other people's reactions into account. More precisely, liberty in that older sense can be explained as follows:

- 1) someone can think like that
- 2) if I want to do, I can do it
- 3) I do not have to think
- 4) someone can say: "I do not want this"
- 5) I don't want or I can't do it because of smth.

Other older examples of the use liberty adduced by Oxford supports an explication along these lines. Consider, for example the following:

You have my full of liberty (freedom) to publish them.(Henry Fielding, *Tom Jones*, 1749 quoted in Oxford).

In this sentence, liberty suggests something related to permission, but in fact it is entirely compatible with the explication proposed above. The speaker is conveying the following message: 1) you can think something like this 2) if I want to publish them, I can do it 3) I do not have to think 4) someone can think: "I do not want this" 5) I can't do it because of that

Needless to say, freedom cannot be used in a context of this kind. A few further examples:

Youthful men who give their eyes the liberty of gazing (Shakespeare, *Comedy of errors*, 1590 quoted in Oxford).

Here, too, permission (to) could be used instead of liberty (of), but the meaning would clearly not be the same: liberty implies here, as in other contexts, that one does what one wants to do, without feeling constrained by other people's possible disapproval.

Some particular matters, which I am not a liberty to report (Richard Steele, *Tatler*, 1709, quoted in Oxford).

Bid him come in and wait for the liberty [freedom] to talk.(Harriet Martineaux, 1963, quoted in Oxford)

In the first example, it is particularly clear that not at liberty refers to the fact that one feels bound by what someone else may say and wish.

Similarly, the expression to take liberty clearly refers to something that the agent wants to do, although someone else may not like it, and has nothing to do with anything that the agent has to do, or does not have to do.

I will...take the liberty to give them...my opinion. (William Cobbett, 1818, quoted in Oxford)

The expression to take the liberty is one of the very few contexts in which the older liberty has survived. The history of the English language has confirmed in a spectacular way the justice of Benjamin Franklin's statement that "the sun of liberty is set". In contemporary English outside a few set phrases, liberty is confined, by and large, to political discourse, and is usually used with respect to people rather than persons. To illustrate:

I would remind you that extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice. (Bary Goldwater, 1964, quoted in Bloomsbury).

In totalitarian states there is no liberty of expression for writers and no liberty of choice for their reader (Aldous Huxley, quoted in Mariam-Webster, 1972).

Above all, the possessive use of liberty (as in man's liberty or his liberty) sharply declined. This sharp decline in the use of possessive modifiers can be illustrated with the following figures: in the corpus on Shakespeare's works, 23% of all the occurrences of liberty have a possessive modifier (23 out of 83), whereas the COBUILD corpus, only 5% do (12 out of 222 including Liberty). Even if we exclude all the examples of Liberty the figures would still be considerably less than in the corpus on Shakespeare's works (12 out of 100:3 of these 12 being instances of the technical phrase liberty of the subject). If liberty tends not to take modifiers any longer, this suggests that the idea enshrined in it has come to be seen as a kind of absolute.

Thus, liberty has survived as a word for an abstract ideal, on a par, it would seem, with other words for abstract ideals such as justice and brotherhood. Nouns of this kind tend to take no complements or prepositional phrases, or at least to be highly limited in this respect. For example, one can say "John's honesty is not in question", but hardly, "John justice is not in question". Names of abstract ideals of this kind are usually restricted to rhetorical generalizations such as the following:

Of a truth, men are mystically united; a mysterious bond of brotherhood makes all men one (Thomas Carlyle, *Essays*, quoted in Stevenson, 1958).

Words of these kind appear to refer to some unquestionable value judgment, along the lines of "people say this is good" or "everyone knows this is good". Liberty in its present rhetorical usage belongs to this category of concepts. Tentatively, it can be explicated as follows:

Liberty (current)

- 1) Everyone can think something like this:
- 2) If I want to do something because I think it is good I can do it
- 3) No one can say: "this person can't do it because I don't want this"
- 4) Everyone thinks: this is good

Clearly, liberty in its present usage does not refer to a person's ability to act as they please with respect to anything whatsoever, no matter how trivial or selfish; the moral connotations of the word suggest that liberty has to do with everybody's inalienable right to do what they think is right and good. At the seventeenth-century governor of Massachusetts, John Winthrop, put it a long time before the word liberty narrowed its use to enshrine the ideal in question, "a liberty to do that only which is good, just, and honest" (quoted in Stevenson 1968).

The Armenian concept of "ազատություն" might seem at first glance to correspond exactly to the English concept of "freedom", especially in view of the fact that, unlike *libertas*, or *liberty*, the word *ազատություն* can take sometimes a "negative" complement corresponding to the English *from*-phrase. For example:

Ամբողջովին ազատության նոր զգացում անցյալից պատեց նրան: (http://freebooks.do.am/load/step'an_zoryan_pap_t'agavor_na_online_tarberak/16-1-0-1970) *He was overcome by a completely new feeling of liberation from the past. (Literary A feeling of ազատության (freedom) from the past, completely new for him, came over him).*

Ոչ ոք կարիք չունի ազատվելու պատրանքներից, ցնորներից այնքան շատ, որքան պարզ, անկիրթ մարդը, և ոչ ոքի ազատությունը չի կարող ունենալ ավելի դրական ազդեցություն ամբողջ հասարակության վրա այնքան, որքան պարզ, հասարակ մարդկանցը: (http://freebooks.do.am/load/nar_dos/16-1-0-866)

Nobody needs ազատություն (freedom) from phantoms as much as the simple, uneducated man, and nobody's liberation can have a more

positive influence on the whole society than that of the simple, uneducated man.

But despite these superficial similarities *ազատություն* does not mean the same as freedom, and it embodies a different perspective on human life. The fact that even in the sentences adduced above, where *ազատություն* takes the preposition *ից* (from) it could not be rendered in English as *freedom* provides evidence for this.

Furthermore, if *ազատություն* often can't be translated as *freedom*, *freedom* can't be translated as *ազատություն*. For example, English expressions such as "freedom from interruptions", "freedom from interference", or "freedom from harassment" could hardly be translated in Armenian as *ազատություն միջատությունից* or the like. To render "freedom from hunger" or "freedom from poverty" as *ազատություն սովից կամ ազատություն աղքատությունից* is completely out of question.

As a further example of a sentence where *ազատություն* could hardly be rendered in English as *freedom*, consider the following:

Պոետի ազատությունը նրանում է, որ նա կարողանա գրել այնպես, ինչպես իր սիրտն է թելադրում՝ առանց կամայական ճնշումների սահմանափակման:

(<http://www.findarmenia.com/arm/culture/literature>)

The ազատություն (freedom) of poetry consists in not restricting one's talent by arbitrary pretensions and in writing what one's heart desires.

In this sentence, *ազատություն* refers to the absence of self-imposed restrictions and pressures that limit the poet's spontaneity and ability to relax and to follow one's inspiration and desires.

It is interesting to note in this connection that *ազատություն* can also be used in a somewhat different, though related, sense, as in the sentences below, where it suggests something like ease and relaxation :

Նա պատասխանեց ուսուցչի հարցերին վստահ և անկաշկանդ (freedom), ինչը բնորոշ է նրան, ով լավ տիրապետում է առարկային:

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He answered to the teacher's questions were given with the ease (freedom) and confidence of one who knows the subject well.

Ինքնաթիռը սլանում էր հակառակ քամու ուղղությամբ՝ ճեղքելով ամպի քուլաները, բայց ինչպիսի թեթևությամբ (freedom) էր այն ճախրում: (<http://lib.amedu.am/category/109> date_created/desc)

The aeroplane was flying against the wind . But with what startling ease(freedom) it wounds its way around the clouds.

In all these sentences, the word *ազատություն* refers to the manner with which some actions are performed. It could be argued that in sentences of this kind *ազատություն* is used with a second meaning, different from the meaning it has, for example, in phrases such as *սյայթաբ հանուն ազատության* "struggle for freedom". The crucial aspect of *ազատություն* highlighted by the secondary use of this word is something like "ease" or "relaxation". It is very significant in this respect that all Armenian dictionaries define *ազատություն* partly with reference to the words: *նեղել, զրկվել, սահմանափակվել* as if *ազատություն* was essentially a "loosening" of some sort of material or psychological "straitjacket". In the examples adduced in dictionaries, too, the words *սահմանափակել* (to constrain) and *սահմանափակում* very frequently co-occur with *ազատություն* as if the two concepts were closely related. A few examples:

Ոչ ոք չի սահմանափակել իմ ազատությունը: Ես արել եմ այն, ինչ ուզում էի անել հատկապես իմ վերջին ֆրանսերենի ուսուցչի հետ բաժանումից հետո:

Nobody restricted my freedom. I did whatever I wanted especially after the departure of my last French tutor.

Քո ճակատագիրը որոշված է: Ես չեմ պատրաստվում այն սահմանափակել. ես քեզ լիակատար ազատություն եմ շնորհում (<http://lib.amedu.am/category/109/> date_created/desc):

Your destiny has been decided: I am not going to restrict you ... I give you complete freedom.

Unlike *libertas* or *freedom*, *ազատություն* suggests a feeling of well-being, caused by the perceived absence of some pressure, some "squeezing" some tight, constraining bonds. It is interesting to note in this context, the frequent collocation "ազատ շունչ քաշել" "to breathe freely". In English "to breathe freely" would suggest that some obstacles to breathing has been removed, this would cause a relief but not exhilarating sense of well-being. But in Armenian "ազատ շունչ քաշել" suggests the image of some oppressive "straitjacket" being loosened so that one's chest can freely expand causing just that: an exhilarating sense of well-being.

The terms *completely* and *fully* have been contrasted advisedly in the last two sentences. The point is that *ազատություն* frequently occurs in the collocation *լիակատար ազատություն full freedom*, whereas *full freedom* is not felicitous in English: one can say *complete freedom*, but hardly *full freedom*. This difference between "full" *ազատություն* and "complete freedom" is very significant because of the "positive" connotations of *full* and "negative" of *complete*. One can speak, for example, of *full responsibility, full length, full blood, or full daylight*, but not of *complete responsibility, length, blood, or daylight* and one can speak of *complete (full) absence of, complete (full) lack of, complete (full) inability to*, and soon. *Freedom* can be "complete" because *complete freedom* suggests "complete absence" of interference, imposition and so on. But *ազատություն* is construed differently, as the following comment by the Armenian lexicographer Մալխասյանց:

Ազատություն՝ 1) քաղաքական անկախություն, ժողովրդի իրավունքը ազատ կերպով տնօրինելու իր պետական, հասարակական, տնտեսական կյանքը, 2) ընդհանրապես ազատ լինելը, հնարավորություն մի բան գործելու կամ չգործելու՝ համաձայն իր ներքին նպատակների և համոզմունքների, 3) ազատ, ազնվական դասակարգի վիճակը, 4) ազատ, ազնվական դասակարգի

արտոնությունները, 5) օտար լծի տակից դուրս գալը, ուրիշի տիրապետության տակից դուրս գալը, 7) ճնշումի արգելքի տակից դուրս գալը (Մալխասյանց, 2010:8):

All these considerations bring us to the following explications:

ազատություն

1) Someone can think something like this

2) If I want to do something, I can do it

3) when I do something, I do not have to think: I can't do it as I want to do it because some people do/say something

4) X feels something good because of this

Component (3) accounts for the experiencer's sense that there are no external constraints on his or her actions, that there is no oppressive "straitjacket" and component (4) spells out the resulting sense of exhilarating well-being. It is interesting to compare the component (3) *ազատություն* with the corresponding component of *libertas*, "when I do something, I do it because I want to do it, not because someone says to me: you have to do it because I want you to do it". Clearly, the Latin concept focuses on not having a master (not being a slave), whereas Armenian one focuses on not sensing any external constraints. The corresponding English concept focuses, as we have seen, on options, and on the absence of interference from other people.

It might be suggested that the connotations of boundless space would be better accounted for if we assigned one additional "spatial" component *ազատություն*, along the lines of "if I want to go somewhere I can do it. However, this would be justified given the fact that *ազատություն* can also occur in such phrases as *մասնովի ազատություն* (*freedom of the press*) and *խղճի ազատություն* (*freedom of conscience*). As we will see later a spatial component will be assigned to another Armenian word (նզի/կաւք) which can't occur in such phrases. As for *ազատություն*, the absence of any perceived constraints on one's actions is sufficiently accounted for in component (3) of the explication: "when I do something I do not have to

think: I can't do it as I want to do it because some people do/say something and also in component (4): "X feels something good because of this".

The cultural idea enshrined in the Armenian concept *ազատություն* corresponds remarkably well to another well-known stereotype of the Armenian nature namely the so-called "հայկական հոգի, ազատական ոգի".

This stereotype suggests the image of a person who loathes restrictions, constraints, bonds of any kind, who feels the need "to spread out", "to overflow" any bounds like a flooding river. In fact, the elements, for example wind, storm, or raging sea, provide another common image for *ազատություն*, as in the following passages:

Ալիքները մոնչում էին սհասարսուռ, կարծես թե զայրացած էին գրանիտե քարերի մեջ փակ լինելուց՝ զրկված ազատությունից և տարածքից:
(http://freebooks.do.am/load/vaxt_39_ang_ananyan_erker_1_rd_hator/16-1-0-1943)

The water in the port is breaking tumultuously and noisily as if it were angry at having been enclosed by granite stones and thus deprived of ազատություն and space.

In English the notion of "freedom" is not similarly linked with the elements, with boundless space, with "wild behaviour", with unconstrained breathing, with intoxicating freedom of movements. Rather it is linked with the individual rights, with private space, with being "left alone" "with privacy and personal independence".

It is also interesting to note how many of the examples of *ազատություն* adduced by large Armenian dictionaries have to do with giving someone "full" *ազատություն* for example:

Հայրը շատ բան չարեց որդու դաստիարակության համա. նա նրան տվեց անսահման ազատություն անելու այն, ինչ ուզում էր:
(<http://library.hayreniq.ru/>)

Father did not do much to bring up his son he gave him complete freedom to fool around as he liked.

Examples of this kind suggest that *ազատություն* unlike *freedom*, can be seen as something that is arbitrary given by another person. This idea is not consistent with the notion of "freedom" which crucially involves compete from other people.

Much more plausibly, the semantic profile of *ազատություն* can be linked with Armenia's political history, the absence of democratic structures or an effective legal system applying equally to everyone, the importance of arbitrary power and the desirability of escape from the power and so on.

So, to sum up what has been mentioned one can say that the concept "freedom" as a multi-faced semantic formation, has cognitive, imaginative and valuable sides which constitute an inextricable part in political viewpoints of western culture.

The concept "freedom" has a very subjective perception and people may have different imagination about it. In this respect the factors of culture and mentality are of paramount importance. People who share the same culture and mentality are more likely to have the same understanding for it. However, different people's understanding about it may be, there is still something in common in perceiving "freedom". What concerns to the concept "liberty" it is worth mentioning that by etymology that concept derives from legally free citizens of a slave country, whereas the linguocultural concept "freedom" was firstly related to benevolently formed interpersonal relationships.

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Լիլիթ Հայրապետյան - դասախոս, Եվրոպական լեզուների և հաղորդակցության ֆակուլտետ, անգլերենի թիվ 1 ամբիոն

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