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## ON ONE NONLINEAR DIFFERENTIAL SEVERAL PERSON GAME IN CASE OF MANY AIM SETS

## A A STEPANYAN<sup>[\\*](#page-0-0)</sup>

## *Chair of Mechanics, YSU*

The differential several person game in case of aim sets is considered, the dynamics of which is described by a nonlinear differential equation. A balance set of strategies is constructed by means of the method of extreme aiming at the corresponding set.

*Keywords***:** differential several person games, many aim sets, balance set of strategies.

**1.** A differential game is considered in the following statement. The dynamics of system is described by the differential equation

$$
\dot{x} = f(t, x, u_1, \dots, u_k), \quad u_i \in P_i \subset R^{n_i}, \quad i = 1, 2, \dots, k. \tag{1.1}
$$

Here  $x \in R^n$  is a phase vector,  $u_i$  is an operating influence of the *i*-th player,  $P_i$  is a compact set in  $R^{n_i}$  space,  $f:[t_0,\infty)\times R^n\times R^{n_1}\times ... \times R^{n_k}\to R^n$  is the vectorfunction that is continuous on the set of all arguments at  $t_0 \le t \le \theta(t_0)$  and  $\theta$  are the given instants of time).

Let us introduce the following notations:

$$
P = P_1 \times \ldots \times P_k, \ P^{(i)} = P_1 \times \ldots \times P_{i-1} \times P_{i+1} \times \ldots P_k,
$$
  
\n
$$
u = (u_1, \ldots, u_k), \ u^{(i)} = (u_1, \ldots, u_{i-1}, u_{i+1}, \ldots, u_k),
$$
  
\n
$$
K = \{1, 2, \ldots, k\}, \ K(i) = \{1, \ldots, i-1, i+1, \ldots, k\}.
$$

It is assumed that function  $f()$  satisfies the condition of infinite continuation of solutions, the condition of Lipschitz with respect to *x* and there is a saddle point for the "small game" [1].

Let  $\mathcal{S}_i$  ( $j = 1, ..., m$ ) be intermediate instants of time on  $[t_0, \theta]$  interval such that  $t_0 = \mathcal{G}_0 < \mathcal{G}_1 < \ldots < \mathcal{G}_m = \theta$ , and the compact sets  $M_1^{(j)}, ..., M_k^{(j)}$  ( $j = 1,...,m$ ) satisfy the following conditions:  $M_i^{(j)} \cap G(\mathcal{G}_j, t_0, x_0) \neq \emptyset$  (*i* = 1, 2, ..., *k*, *j* = 1, ..., *m*).

Here the area of approachability of system (1.1) from the position  $\{t_0, x_0\}$  at an instant  $\mathcal{G}_j$  is denoted as  $G(\mathcal{G}_j, t_0, x_0)$ . The set  $M_i^{(j)}$  is aim set for the *i*-th player at the instant  $\mathcal{G}_j$ .

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<span id="page-0-0"></span><sup>\*</sup> E-mail: [Mexanikus2006@yahoo.com](mailto:Mexanikus2006@yahoo.com) 

Now consider the differential several person game for many aim sets, in which each player tries to reduce the total motion distance from the aim sets at the instants  $\mathcal{G}_i$ , i.e. the aim of the *i* -th player is to approach the sets  $M_i^{(j)}$  at instants  $\mathcal{G}_i$  ( $j = 1, ..., m$ ).

In this work the questions of existence of balance set of strategies concerning to the initial position is considered.

Let  $\{t_0, x_0\}$  be an initial position of system (1.1), where  $x_0 = x(t_0)$ ,  $\Delta_r$  is the splitting of half-interval  $t_0 \le t < \infty$ ,  $\tau_1^{(r)}$ ,  $\tau_2^{(r)}$ ,... are splitting nodes, then the diameter of splitting will be  $\delta_r = \sup_s(\tau_{s+1}^{(r)} - \tau_s^{(r)})$ . It is supposed that at any splitting

 $\Delta_r$  the instants  $\mathcal{G}_j$  ( $j = 1, ..., m$ ) are splitting nodes, i.e.

$$
\tau_{s_0}^{(r)} = t_0 = \mathcal{G}_0, \ \tau_{s_1}^{(r)} = \mathcal{G}_1, \ \dots \ , \ \tau_{s_m}^{(r)} = \mathcal{G}_m = \theta \ . \tag{1.2}
$$

The sectionally positioning control  $u_i^{(s)}[\tau_s^{(r)}, x[\tau_s^{(r)}]]$  and strategies of players  $U_i$ , the Euler's broken lines

$$
x_{\Delta}^{(s)}\left[\cdot,\tau_{s}^{(r)},x_{\Delta}^{(s)}[\tau_{s}^{(r)}],u_{i_{1}}[\tau_{s}^{(r)},x_{\Delta}^{(s)}[\tau_{s}^{(r)}]],\ldots,u_{i_{l}}[\tau_{s}^{(r)},x_{\Delta}^{(s)}[\tau_{s}^{(r)}]],u_{i_{l+1}}[t],\ldots,u_{i_{k}}[t]\right],
$$

generated by the controls of *l* players  $(1 \le l \le k)$ , are defined on  $\left[\tau_s^{(r)}, \tau_{s+l}^{(r)}\right]$  $(s = 0, 1, \ldots)$  intervals. On the whole interval  $[t_0, \theta]$  the motion of system is defined as an absolutely continuous function, for which one can find th e Euler's broken lines that uniformly converge to it. By  $X[t_0, x_0, U_{i_1}, \ldots, U_{i_l}]$  we denote the totality of all movements leaving the position  $\{t_0, x_0\}$  and generated by the strategies  $U_{i_1}, \ldots, U_{i_l}$  of *l* players (1 ≤ *l* ≤ *k*). It is called the bunch of movements.

2. Let the players work for the stability of situation: the choice of strategy for each player is based on some principle, the deviation from which can result in an increase of the gain of other players. Such a principle is the case at the choice of balance set of strategies defined as follows:

*Definition 1.* The set of strategies  $\{U_1^o, ..., U_k^o\}$  is referred to as balanced with respect to the initial position  $\{t_0, x_0\}$ , if for each number  $i \in K$  any movement *x*[ $\cdot$ ] from the bunch  $X[t_0, x_0, U_1^o, ..., U_{i-1}^o, U_{i+1}^o, ..., U_k^o]$  avoids meeting the set  $M_i^{(j)}$  up to the instant  $\mathcal{G}_i$  for all  $j = 1, \dots, m$ .

The balance set of strategies of players will be constructed using the method of aiming at the corresponding set [1].

Let the set W be given in space  $[t_0, \theta] \times R^n$ , in which for all  $t \in [t_0, \theta]$  $W(t) = \{x \mid \{t, x\} \in W\} \neq \emptyset$  and which satisfies the following two conditions:

*Condition 1.* The set *W* is closed, and for all  $i \in K$  and  $j = 1,...,m$ 

$$
W(\mathcal{G}_j) \cap M_i^{(j)} = \varnothing.
$$

*Condition 2.* Irrespective of the position  $\{t_*, x_*\} \in W$ , the number  $i \in K$ , the vector  $u_i^*(t) \in P_i$  and instant of time  $t^* \in [t_*, \theta]$ , there are admissible strategies  $u_{\alpha}(\cdot) \in P_{\alpha}$ ,  $\alpha \in K(i)$ , such that for the solution *x*( $\cdot$ ) of differential equation

$$
\dot{x} = f(t, x, u_1, \dots, u_{i-1}, u_i^*, u_{i+1}, \dots, u_k), \quad x(t_*) = x_*, \tag{2.1}
$$

it holds that  $\{t^*, x(t^*)\} \in W$  (or, what is the same, there is a movement *x*(·) from a bunch of movements  $X[t_*, x_*, U_i^*]$  such that  $\{t^*, x(t^*)\} \in W$ ).

Now define the set of strategies  $U_1^e, ..., U_k^e$  extreme to set *W*, that satisfies the following two conditions  $[1]$ :

*Condition 3.* If  $\{t, x\} \notin W$  and  $W(t) = \{x/\{t, x\} \in W\} \neq \emptyset$ , then for all  $i \in K$ the strategies  $u_i^e = U_i^e(t, x)$  are found from equality

$$
\max_{u_a \in P_a(a \in K(i))} (x - w)' f(t, x, u_1, \dots, u_{i-1}, u_i^e, u_{i+1}, \dots, u_k) =
$$
\n
$$
= \min_{u_i \in P_i} \max_{u_a \in P_a(a \in K(i))} (x - w)' f(t, x, u_1, \dots, u_k).
$$
\n(2.2)

Here *w* is watever vector (the same for all  $i$ ) satisfying the condition

$$
||x - w|| = \min_{w \in W(t)} ||x - w||.
$$

*Condition 4.* If  $\{t, x\} \notin W$ , but  $W(t) = \emptyset$  or  $\{t, x\} \in W$ , then  $u_i^e(t, x)$  is an arbitrary vector from  $P_i$  for all  $i \in K$ .

*Theorem 1.* Let the set *W* satisfies Conditions 1 and 2 and  $\{t, x\} \in W$ . Then the set of strategies defined by the Conditions 3 and 4 is balanced (in the sense of Definition 1) with respect to the initial position  $\{t, x\}$ .

*Proof.* Let the *i*-th player select an admissible strategy  $U_i$ . It will be shown that  $x(t^*, t, x, U_1^e, ..., U_{i-1}^e, U_i, U_{i+1}^e, ..., U_k^e) \in W(t^*)$  at  $t \le t^* \le \theta$ .

Now denote as  $(K(i), i, W(t), M<sub>i</sub><sup>(j)</sup>, {9<sub>i</sub>}, j = 1,...,m)$  the differential game of two persons, in which the set of players  $K(i)$  seeks to hold out the movement in set *W* by instants  $\mathcal{S}_i$ , and the *i*-th player seeks to deviate the movement of system from sets  $W(\mathcal{G}_i)$ ,  $j = 1,...,m$ .

The strategies defined by Conditions 3 and 4 keep the system state in the set *W* for any movement from  $X[t_0, x_0, U_1^e, \ldots, U_{i-1}^e, U_{i+1}^e, \ldots, U_k^e]$  commenced in it up to the instants  $\mathcal{G}_j$  ( $j = 1,...,m$ ). Therefore, the extreme strategies form barriers around the set W that impede the exit of movements  $x[t]$  from W up to the instants  $\mathcal{G}_j$ . Hence, according to [1] (Lemma 15.1), the strategies  $U_1^e, ..., U_{i-1}^e, U_{i+1}^e, ..., U_k^e$ would hold the system movement on the set W till the instants of time  $\mathcal{G}_j$ ,  $j = 1,...,m$ , for any strategy  $U_i$ , i.e. the set of strategies  $U_1^e,...,U_{i-1}^e, U_{i+1}^e,...,U_k^e$  is balanced initial positions from *W* .

For construction of set  $W$  for the following reasoning will be used.

Let the sets  $N^{(j)}$  ( $j = 1,...,m$ ) are the convex compacts in  $R^n$  that satisfy the conditions  $N^{(j)} \cap M_i^{(j)} = \emptyset$ ,  $i \in K$ ,  $j = 1,...,m$ .

Let the system reach the position  $\{t, x\}$  ( $\mathcal{G}_{r-1} \leq t < \mathcal{G}_r$ ). Now define

$$
\varepsilon_i^0(t, x) = \max_{\substack{\|l_{\beta}^{(i)}\|=1, \beta=r, \dots, m \\ \int_{t}^{a} \max_{u_i \in P_i} \min_{u_{\alpha} \in \mathcal{E}_{\alpha}(\alpha \in K(i))}} \sum_{j=r}^{m} \left( \langle l_j^{(i)}, x \rangle + \min_{-q \in N^{(j)}} \langle l_j^{(i)}, q \rangle + \int_{t}^{a} \max_{u_i \in P_i} \min_{u_{\alpha} \in \mathcal{E}_{\alpha}(\alpha \in K(i))} \langle l_j^{(i)}, f^j(\tau, x, u_1, \dots, u_k) \rangle \, d\tau \right), \tag{2.3}
$$

if the right hand side is more than zero and  $\varepsilon_i^0(t, x) = 0$  otherwise. Here

$$
f^{j}(\tau, x, u_1, \ldots, u_k) = \begin{cases} f(\tau, x, u_1, \ldots, u_k) & \text{at } \tau \leq \theta_j, \\ 0 & \text{at } \tau > \theta_j. \end{cases}
$$

Let

$$
\varepsilon^{0}(t,x) = \max_{i \in K} \varepsilon_{i}^{0}(t,x), \qquad (2.4)
$$

 $\varepsilon_i^0(t, x)$ ,  $\varepsilon^0(t, x)$  being continuous functions of their arguments. Now introduce the following notations:

• denote as  $I^{(0)}(t, x)$  the set of maximizing indexes in (2.4) for position  $\{t, x\}$ , where  $\varepsilon^{0}(t, x) > 0$  and  $I^{(0)}(t, x) = K$ , if  $\varepsilon^{0}(t, x) = 0$ ;

• denote as  $L_i^0(t, x)$  the totality of sets of vectors  $l_j^{(i)}$  ( $j = r, ..., m$ ) maximizing the functions  $\varepsilon_i^0(t, x)$  (2.3), if  $\varepsilon_i^0(t, x) > 0$  and  $L_i^0(t, x)$  completely coincides with the unit sphere in position  $\{t, x\}$ , where  $\varepsilon_i^0(t, x) = 0$ ;

$$
L^{0}(t,x) = \bigcup_{i \in I^{0}(t,x)} L^{0}(t,x) ;
$$
  

$$
S_{i}^{0}(t,x) = \left\{ s_{i} = \sum_{j=r}^{m} l_{j}^{(i)}, l_{j}^{(i)} \in L^{0}(t,x) \right\} ; \quad S^{0}(t,x) = \bigcup_{i \in I^{0}(t,x)} S_{i}^{0}(t,x) .
$$

We assume that the following conditions are satisfied:

*Condition 5.* For each number  $i \in K$  and for any position  $\{t, x\}$ , where  $\varepsilon_i^0(t, x) > 0$ , in (2.3) maxima are reached on a unique set  $I_j^{(i)}$  ( $j = r, ..., m$ ).

*Condition 6.* In each position  $\{t, x\}$ , where  $\varepsilon^{0}(t, x) > 0$ , for any numbers  $i \in I^0$ {*t*, *x*}, vector  $s_i \in S_i^0$  and index  $\alpha \in K$  there takes place

$$
\max_{u_i \in P_i} \min_{u_{\alpha} \in P_{\alpha}} \langle s_i, f(t, x, u_1, \dots, u_k) \rangle \ge \max_{u_{\alpha} \in P_{\alpha}} \min_{u_i \in P_i} \langle s_i, f(t, x, u_1, \dots, u_k) \rangle. \tag{2.5}
$$

 $i \in K$  there is a vector  $u_i^0 \in P_i$ , such that for all  $s_i \in S_i^0$  there takes place an equali ty *Condition 7.* In each position  $\{t, x\}$ , where  $\varepsilon^{0}(t, x) > 0$ , for any number

 $\min_{u_i \in P_i} \max_{u_{\alpha} \in P_{\alpha}(\alpha \in K(i))} \langle s, f(t, x, u_1, ..., u_k) \rangle = \max_{u_{\alpha} \in P_{\alpha}(\alpha \in K(i))} \langle s, f(t, x, u_1, ..., u_{i-1}, u_i^0 u_{i+1}, ..., u_k) \rangle.$ 

*Theorem 2.* Under Conditions 5, 6, 7 the set  $W = \{ \{t, x\}, \varepsilon^0(t, x) \le 0 \}$  will satisfy Conditions 1, 2.

*Proof.* As from the definition of  $\varepsilon^{0}(t, x)$ , i.e. from (2.3) and (2.4), there follows the closure of set  $W$ , hence, the Condition 1 is satisfied. The fulfillment of 2 will be shown by contradiction assuming that there is a position Condition  $\{t_*, x_*\} \in W$ , a number  $i \in K$ , a vector  $u_i^0 \in P_i$  and an instant  $t^* \in (t_*, \theta)$  such that the solution of differential equation

$$
\dot{x} = f(t, x, u_1, \dots, u_{i-1}, u_i^0, u_{i+1}, \dots, u_k), \quad x(t_*) = x_*, \tag{2.6}
$$

for any  $u_{\alpha}$   $(\alpha \in K(i))$ , leaves the set *W* at the instant  $t^*$ . Now choose vectors  $u_{\alpha}^*$ ,  $\alpha \in K(i)$ , satisfying the Condition 7:

$$
\max_{u_{\beta} \in P_{\beta}(\beta \in K(\alpha))} < s, f(t, x, u_1, ..., u_{\alpha-1}, u_{\alpha}^*, u_{\alpha+1}, ..., u_k) > =
$$
\n
$$
= \min_{u_{\alpha} \in P_{\alpha}} \max_{u_{\beta} \in P_{\beta}(\beta \in K(\alpha))} < s, f(t, x, u_1, ..., u_{\alpha-1}, u_{\alpha}, u_{\alpha+1}, ..., u_k) >, s \in S^0(t, x).
$$
\n(2.7)

Here  $x(·)$  is a solution of equation (2.6) for controls from (2.7). Then according to above assumptions there is an interval  $[t_1, t_2] \subset [t_*, t^*]$  such that  $\varepsilon^{0}(t, x) > 0$  almost for all  $t \in [t_1, t_2]$  and  $\varepsilon^{0}(t_1, x(t_1)) < \varepsilon^{0}(t_2, x(t_2))$ .

From [1, 2] it follows that  $\varepsilon^0 : t \to \varepsilon^0(t, x(t))$  is a differentiable function of *t* almost everywhere on  $[t_1, t_2]$  and  $\exists p \in I^0(t, x(t))$ 

$$
\frac{d\varepsilon^{0}(t, x(t))}{dt} = \frac{d\varepsilon_{p}(t, x(t))}{dt} = \sum_{j=r}^{m}  -
$$
\n
$$
- \sum_{j=r}^{m} \min_{u_{p} \in P_{p}} \max_{u_{\alpha} \in P_{\alpha}(\alpha \in K(p))} < l_{j}^{(p)} f(t, x, u_{1}, \dots, u_{p-1}, u_{p}, u_{p+1}, \dots, u_{k}) > .
$$
\n(2.8)

After transformations with due regard for  $(2.7)$  from  $(2.8)$  we obtain

$$
\frac{d\varepsilon(t, x(t))}{dt} \leq \max_{u_i \in P_i} \min_{u_\rho \in P_\rho} \min_{\substack{u_a \in P_a, \\ a \in K, a \neq p, i}} < s^\rho, f(t, x, u_1, \dots, u_k) > -\max_{u_\rho \in P_i} \min_{u_a \in P_a, \atop a \in K, a \neq p, i} < s^\rho, f(t, x, u_1, \dots, u_k) > \leq 0.
$$

The validity of the last inequality follows from Condition 6. It turns out that almost everywhere on the interval  $[t_1, t_2]$   $\frac{d\varepsilon_p}{dt} \le 0$ , but  $\varepsilon^0(t_1, x(t_1)) \ge \varepsilon^0(t_2, x(t_2))$ , what contradicts the assumption. Hence, the Condition 2 holds.

Thus, it is shown that for differential several person games in case of many aim sets the strategies, extreme to a corresponding stable set, make a balance set with respect to initial positions.

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